Part I: The Contested Arena: Defining the Terms of Engagement
The contemporary political landscape is defined by a profound and escalating challenge to the principles of liberal democracy. This challenge, emanating from populist movements across the globe, is not merely a contest over policy but a fundamental conflict over the nature of political legitimacy, the role of institutions, and the very definition of “the people.” To comprehend the stakes of this confrontation, it is essential to first establish a clear analytical framework, defining the core tenets of the system under threat, the nature of the ideology challenging it, and the concept of resilience by which the system’s capacity for survival can be measured. The current crisis represents a stress test for the constitutional architecture painstakingly constructed over centuries, forcing a re-examination of its strengths and vulnerabilities in the face of an internal, ideological adversary.
A. The Architecture of Liberal Democracy: Beyond Majority Rule
Liberal democracy, also known as Western-style or substantive democracy, is a form of governance that marries the principle of popular sovereignty with the philosophy of liberalism. Its intellectual origins trace back to the Age of Enlightenment, particularly to thinkers like John Locke, who argued that governments derive their legitimacy from the “consent of the governed” and are established to serve the people, not the other way around. This foundational idea inverted the traditional hierarchy of power and established a social contract wherein the state’s authority is conditional and limited. The core innovation of liberal democracy is its recognition that pure majority rule can be as tyrannical as any monarch. Consequently, it erects a complex institutional architecture designed to both empower and constrain the popular will.
The essential components of this architecture are threefold. First is the separation of powers, which divides governmental authority among distinct branches—typically the executive, legislative, and judicial—to prevent the concentration of power in any single entity. This system of “checks and balances” creates a framework of mutual accountability. In many larger states, this horizontal separation is complemented by a vertical separation of powers known as federalism, which distributes authority between national, regional, and local governments, further diffusing power and preventing its abuse.
Second is the unwavering commitment to the rule of law, a concept formulated in Europe as Rechtsstaat. This principle dictates that governmental authority may only be exercised in accordance with written, publicly disclosed laws adopted through established procedures. Crucially, it posits that the law applies equally to the governors and the governed, ensuring that no one is above the law. This framework is typically enshrined in a constitution, whether codified or uncodified, which delineates the powers of government and serves as the supreme law of the land.
Third, and most vital to its “liberal” character, is the robust protection of civil liberties and minority rights. Liberal democracy is not merely a system of electoral democracy; it is a substantive one that guarantees fundamental freedoms such as speech, assembly, and association, and protects the rights of individuals and minority groups from infringement by the majority. These rights are considered indispensable for genuine democratic contestation and are legally protected from state encroachment, often through an independent judiciary. It is this commitment to pluralism and the safeguarding of dissent that distinguishes liberal democracy from illiberal or majoritarian forms of democracy, which may hold elections but lack the institutional safeguards for individual freedom.
B. Deconstructing Populism: An Ideology of Antagonism
Populism presents itself as a more authentic form of democracy, yet its core logic is fundamentally at odds with the pluralistic ethos of the liberal order. Scholars widely define populism not as a comprehensive political doctrine but as a “thin-centered ideology” that can attach itself to various political programs, from left-wing economic redistribution to right-wing ethno-nationalism. Its defining characteristic is a moralistic and Manichean worldview that cleaves society into two homogenous and antagonistic camps: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”.
In this framework, “the people” are constructed as a virtuous, unified entity possessing a singular common interest or “general will” (volonté générale). The “elite,” conversely, is depicted as a conspiring, morally inferior group that has betrayed the people for its own selfish gain. This elite is broadly defined to include not just political opponents but also cultural institutions, the judiciary, independent media, and civil society organizations—essentially, all mediating bodies that stand between the populist leader and the people.
This ideological construction has profound anti-pluralist implications. If the people are a homogenous whole with a single will, then any internal disagreement or opposition is rendered illegitimate. Political adversaries are not seen as legitimate competitors in a pluralistic debate but as part of the corrupt elite and, therefore, “enemies of the people”. Populism thus rejects the idea of democracy as a space for debating and deciding among diverging interests. This fundamental incompatibility with pluralism is the primary source of the populist challenge to liberal democracy. The conflict is not between democracy and anti-democracy, as populists claim to champion the former, but between a liberal, pluralistic conception of democracy and an illiberal, anti-pluralist one.
Furthermore, populism contains a central paradox. While its rhetoric is vehemently anti-elitist, its political practice is inherently elitist, calling for a strong, charismatic leader who can uniquely discern and channel the authentic will of the people. This leader claims a direct, unmediated connection to the populace, justifying the circumvention of established institutions and procedures. The populist leader does not represent the people; they claim to
embody them, a position that rationalizes the concentration of power and an intolerance for any form of opposition.
C. The Concept of Constitutional Resilience: A System’s Immune Response
In the face of this ideological assault, the survival of liberal democracy depends on its constitutional resilience. Drawing from systems theory in fields like ecology, resilience is understood not as static rigidity but as the capacity of a system to withstand, adapt to, and recover from disruptive shocks while maintaining its core functions and principles. In the democratic context, it is the ability of a state’s governance architecture to uphold democratic norms despite attempts by illiberal actors to degrade them.
This resilience operates through the key accountability mechanisms of a liberal democracy. It relies on horizontal accountability, the system of checks and balances among branches of government; vertical accountability, the answerability of rulers to the citizenry through elections and public discourse; and diagonal accountability, the oversight provided by independent media and civil society. A populist assault is an attack on all three fronts simultaneously, aiming to dismantle institutional checks, corrupt the electoral process, and silence independent oversight.
Recent scholarship has conceptualized democratic resilience as a two-stage process. The first stage is
onset resilience, which refers to the capacity of a well-functioning democracy to resist the initial emergence of significant democratic backsliding. This involves having strong, trusted institutions and a vibrant civic culture that can preemptively counter illiberal tendencies. The second stage is
breakdown resilience, which comes into play once democratic erosion is already underway. It is the ability of the system’s remaining democratic components—be it a defiant judiciary, a mobilized opposition, or a resilient civil society—to halt the slide and prevent a complete collapse into authoritarianism.
The concept of resilience underscores that a constitution’s text alone is insufficient. Its strength is not passive but active, dependent on the dynamic interplay between formal institutions, political actors, and an engaged citizenry. It is the democratic system’s immune response, and its effectiveness is determined by the health and coordination of all its constituent parts. The populist challenge, by exploiting crises and using incremental, legalistic tactics to hollow out institutions from within, tests this immune system in ways that are more subtle but no less perilous than overt authoritarian coups.
Part II: The Populist Assault on Constitutional Order: A Global Analysis
Populist leaders, once in power, deploy a remarkably consistent playbook to deconstruct the liberal democratic order. While the specific tactics are tailored to the unique constitutional and political contexts of their respective nations, the overarching strategy is universal: the systematic dismantling of institutional constraints on executive power. This process, often described as “democratic backsliding” or “autocratic legalism,” proceeds not through a sudden, violent overthrow of the constitution but through its gradual erosion from within, using the very tools of law and governance to achieve anti-democratic ends. This section provides a global analysis of this playbook, examining the assault on the executive, judiciary, and the pillars of public accountability.
A. The Executive’s Power Grab: Aggrandizement and the Erosion of Checks and Balances
The primary objective of any populist government is the concentration of power in the executive branch. This executive aggrandizement is portrayed as a necessary measure to enact the “will of the people” without obstruction from “corrupt” institutions. A key tactic is the exploitation of crises—whether real or manufactured—such as economic recessions, security threats, or public health emergencies. Such events provide a pretext for declaring states of emergency, which grant the executive extraordinary powers to rule by decree, bypass legislative oversight, and curtail civil liberties.
Once in power, populist leaders systematically weaken horizontal checks and balances. This often involves marginalizing the legislature, either by ignoring its oversight functions or, in systems where the populist’s party controls a majority, using it as a rubber stamp for the executive’s agenda. Empirical analysis reveals a stark pattern: over 50% of populist leaders amend or completely rewrite their countries’ constitutions. These constitutional changes are not aimed at improving governance but at consolidating power, frequently by extending or abolishing presidential term limits, weakening independent institutions, and formally expanding executive authority.
The case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party provides a paradigmatic example. Since 2010, Orbán has used his parliamentary supermajority to pass a new “Fundamental Law” and a series of constitutional amendments that have systematically dismantled the country’s democratic checks and balances, centralizing power in the executive and entrenching his party’s rule. Similarly, in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leveraged a failed coup attempt to justify a sweeping crackdown on opposition and pushed through a constitutional referendum that transformed the country’s parliamentary system into a hyper-presidential one, concentrating immense power in his own hands. In Latin America, the late Hugo Chávez of Venezuela used a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution that dramatically expanded presidential power and removed term limits, paving the way for his prolonged rule and the eventual collapse of Venezuelan democracy.
B. Capturing the Guardian: The War on Judicial Independence
Because an independent judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional limits and the primary defender of the rule of law, it represents a formidable obstacle to the populist project. Consequently, constitutional courts and supreme courts become prime targets for capture or neutralization. Populist leaders understand that to exercise unconstrained power, they must first silence the umpires of the constitutional game.
The assault on the judiciary unfolds through a combination of institutional and rhetorical tactics. A common strategy is court-packing, which involves altering the rules governing the composition or size of a high court to fill it with loyalists. The post-2015 actions of the Law and Justice (PiS) government in Poland are a textbook case. The PiS government refused to seat judges lawfully chosen by the previous parliament, manipulated retirement ages to purge sitting judges, and packed the Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court with politically subservient figures, effectively paralyzing the judiciary’s ability to provide independent constitutional scrutiny.
Beyond packing, populist governments engage in jurisdictional stripping, passing laws that curtail a court’s authority to hear cases or review government actions in politically sensitive areas. This is often accompanied by a relentless campaign of
rhetorical delegitimization. Judges are publicly vilified as unelected, out-of-touch elites who are thwarting the popular will and acting as political opponents rather than impartial arbiters of the law. This narrative erodes public trust in the judiciary, making it easier to justify institutional attacks and creating a political climate where defying court rulings becomes acceptable. This fusion of legal and political attacks creates a pincer movement that isolates and ultimately subordinates the judicial branch to the executive’s will.
C. Undermining the Mandate: The Subversion of Electoral Integrity and Press Freedom
To maintain their grip on power, populists must control both the mechanisms of public choice (elections) and the sources of public information (the media). The goal is to corrupt the pillars of vertical and diagonal accountability, ensuring that the regime cannot be effectively challenged at the ballot box or in the court of public opinion.
The subversion of electoral integrity is often achieved through subtle, legalistic means rather than overt fraud. Populist incumbents use their legislative majorities to rewrite electoral laws in their favor. Tactics include partisan gerrymandering to create safe districts, altering systems of representation to disproportionately benefit the ruling party, and changing campaign finance regulations to disadvantage the opposition. Hungary’s Fidesz government, for instance, redesigned the country’s electoral system in a way that allowed it to repeatedly secure a two-thirds parliamentary “supermajority” with less than 50% of the popular vote, effectively locking in its power. Populists also attack the credibility of independent electoral management bodies, accusing them of bias to preemptively delegitimize any future election results that are unfavorable.
Simultaneously, populist regimes wage a war on press freedom to control the political narrative. This involves a multi-pronged strategy to silence critical voices and promote pro-government propaganda. Governments pass vaguely worded laws against “fake news,” “disinformation,” or threats to “national security,” which are then selectively used to prosecute and intimidate independent journalists. Economic pressure is another powerful tool; state advertising funds are channeled exclusively to friendly media outlets while critical ones are starved of revenue or targeted with punitive tax audits. In more extreme cases, as seen in Hungary and Turkey, government-aligned oligarchs buy up independent media outlets, consolidating a vast pro-government media empire that dominates the information landscape. This creates an echo chamber that reinforces the populist leader’s message, demonizes opponents, and makes it difficult for citizens to access objective information, thereby undermining the very basis of informed democratic consent.
Table 1: A Comparative Matrix of Populist Tactics Against Democratic Institutions
| Institution | Hungary (Orbán) | Poland (PiS) | Brazil (Bolsonaro) | India (Modi) | United States (Trump) |
| Judiciary | Constitutional amendments to limit court jurisdiction; court-packing through new appointment rules. | Court-packing of Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court; forced retirement of judges; ignoring court rulings. | Rhetorical attacks on Supreme Court justices; threats of non-compliance with rulings; pressure on law enforcement agencies. | Executive pressure on judicial appointments; use of “judicial populism” where courts align with state goals over rights. | Rhetorical delegitimization of judges; politicization of judicial appointments; challenging judicial review authority. |
| Electoral System | Redrawing electoral map and changing voting laws to secure supermajority with a minority of votes. | Capture of electoral oversight bodies; use of state media for partisan campaigning. | Baseless attacks on the integrity of the electronic voting system; attempts to delegitimize electoral results. | Use of ethno-nationalist rhetoric to polarize electorate; questions raised about the independence of the Election Commission. | Spreading misinformation about electoral fraud; challenging and attempting to overturn legitimate election results. |
| Media/Press Freedom | State-sponsored consolidation of media under pro-government oligarchs; shutdown of independent outlets. | Conversion of public media into a state propaganda tool; lawsuits against critical journalists. | Constant verbal attacks on journalists and media outlets; restricting press access. | Use of sedition and defamation laws against journalists; economic pressure on media companies. | Labeling critical media “enemies of the people”; use of social media to bypass and attack traditional press. |
| Civil Liberties | Laws targeting foreign-funded NGOs; marginalization of minority groups (LGBTQ+, migrants) through legislation. | Restrictions on assembly rights; creation of an “ideological state” hostile to liberal values. | Anti-environmental policies infringing on indigenous rights; rhetoric inciting violence against minorities. | Use of ethno-religious majoritarianism to marginalize Muslim minority; crackdown on civil society and dissent. | Use of executive orders to target specific minority groups (e.g., travel ban); rhetoric challenging established norms of tolerance. |
The pattern that emerges from this comparative analysis is clear and alarming. Populist leaders engage in a form of constitutional warfare, using the instruments of the state to systematically dismantle the institutional and normative foundations of liberal democracy. This process is incremental and legalistic, making it particularly insidious. It does not arrive with a bang but with the slow, steady chipping away of rights, norms, and institutions until all that remains is the hollowed-out shell of a democracy, animated by the unconstrained will of a single leader. This trajectory from a flawed democracy to a consolidated illiberal regime demonstrates a shared global playbook, a transnational network of illiberal learning where tactics pioneered in one country are adapted and deployed in others, creating a feedback loop that normalizes and accelerates democratic decay worldwide.
Part III: The Immune Response: Gauging the Effectiveness of Democratic Guardrails
As populist leaders execute their playbook of institutional erosion, the resilience of a liberal democracy is put to the ultimate test. The effectiveness of its “immune response”—the network of formal and informal institutions designed to constrain power and protect liberty—determines whether democratic backsliding can be halted or reversed. This response is not monolithic; it involves a complex interplay between the judiciary, other state bodies, and the broader civic sphere. A critical assessment reveals a mixed record, where the success or failure of these democratic guardrails is highly contingent on political context, institutional design, and the degree of public mobilization.
A. The Judiciary on Trial: Constitutional Courts as Vanguards or Vulnerable Targets?
Constitutional and supreme courts are often cast as the principal vanguards against democratic decay, the last line of defense for the rule of law. Their capacity to act as an effective bulwark, however, is far from guaranteed. Head-on collisions between courts and popular, determined executives often end badly for the judiciary, which lacks the powers of the purse or the sword. Leaders intent on undermining a court have numerous tools at their disposal, from packing it with loyalists to simply ignoring its rulings.
Despite these vulnerabilities, there are notable instances of successful judicial resistance. The Constitutional Court of Colombia, for example, skillfully resisted attempts by popular president Álvaro Uribe to amend the constitution to allow himself a third term. The court’s success was attributed to a combination of strong public support, a strategy of avoiding direct confrontation in early years while subtly using socioeconomic rights to challenge the executive, and the backing of a robust civil society. Similarly, the Brazilian Supreme Court has played a crucial, albeit contested, role in checking some of the most flagrant anti-democratic actions and rhetoric of former President Jair Bolsonaro, acting as a “moderating power” in the country’s polarized political system.
These successes stand in stark contrast to the failures in countries like Hungary and Turkey, where the judiciary was swiftly captured and transformed from a check on power into an instrument of it. The divergence in outcomes reveals that judicial resilience is not an inherent quality. It depends critically on external factors. A court can only stand firm if it is perceived as legitimate by the public, if its decisions are reinforced by other institutions, and if a mobilized civil society is prepared to defend its independence. Without these supporting pillars, the judiciary becomes an isolated and vulnerable target. This demonstrates a crucial interdependence among resilience mechanisms: the strength of any single democratic guardrail is contingent upon the integrity of the others. A court’s ruling has little force if a captured legislature can overturn it, a state-controlled media can delegitimize it, and a demobilized public fails to defend it.
B. The Resilience of the Rules: Electoral Commissions and Parliamentary Checks
Beyond the judiciary, other formal institutions are designed to ensure democratic accountability. Independent Electoral Commissions (IECs) are tasked with guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process, the primary mechanism of vertical accountability. Their effectiveness is a direct function of their institutional independence—their insulation from political pressure, the security of their funding, and the transparency of their operations. However, because they oversee the very process by which populists retain power, IECs are often among the first institutions to be targeted for capture or delegitimization. When an IEC is strong and independent, it can serve as a vital check on electoral manipulation. When it is weakened or staffed with political loyalists, it can become an agent of democratic backsliding, rubber-stamping flawed elections and lending a veneer of legitimacy to an unfair process.
The legislature, in theory, serves as the primary check on executive overreach. In practice, its ability to perform this function is severely compromised in the current political environment. In parliamentary systems where a populist party commands a legislative supermajority, as in Hungary, the parliament ceases to be a check and instead becomes the primary engine of constitutional deconstruction. In presidential systems characterized by high levels of partisan polarization, such as the United States, the legislature often succumbs to gridlock. This paralysis frustrates citizens and makes them more receptive to populist leaders who promise to break the rules to “get things done”. An effective opposition requires the formation of broad, unified anti-authoritarian coalitions that can transcend ideological differences to defend democratic institutions. However, the same polarization that fuels populism often makes such cross-party cooperation exceedingly difficult.
This dynamic highlights a central dilemma for democracy’s defenders. In responding to a populist leader who consistently violates established norms, opposition actors and institutions are often tempted or forced to engage in “constitutional hardball”—using their own powers to the absolute legal limit. While such actions may be necessary to block an immediate anti-democratic move, they risk accelerating the erosion of the unwritten norms of forbearance and mutual toleration that underpin a functioning democracy. This can trigger a tit-for-tat escalatory cycle, where politics becomes a zero-sum war, further degrading the democratic process and validating the populist’s claim that the system is broken.
C. Beyond Formal Institutions: The Role of Civil Society and a Pluralistic Public Sphere
Ultimately, constitutional resilience resides not just in formal rules and state bodies but in the fabric of society itself. A vibrant and pluralistic public sphere, sustained by a free press and an active civil society, provides the “diagonal accountability” that is essential for holding power in check. These actors are the immune system’s sentinels, tasked with identifying and sounding the alarm about threats to the democratic order.
An independent media serves as a crucial watchdog, investigating government corruption, fact-checking official narratives, and providing citizens with the information necessary to make informed political choices. This is precisely why it is so aggressively targeted by populist regimes. Where the media remains diverse and resilient, it can effectively counter government propaganda and expose abuses of power. Where it is captured or intimidated into silence, the public is left in an information vacuum, susceptible to manipulation.
Similarly, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)—including human rights groups, anti-corruption watchdogs, and community associations—play a vital role in mobilizing citizens, advocating for democratic principles, and monitoring the actions of the state. Large-scale social mobilization and public protest can raise the political costs of authoritarian actions, demonstrating to would-be autocrats that their encroachments on democracy will be met with widespread resistance. The resilience of liberal democracy, therefore, is deeply intertwined with the health of its civic life. A robust constitution can be rendered meaningless if the citizenry is passive, uninformed, or demobilized. Conversely, even in the face of captured state institutions, a determined and organized civil society can provide a powerful source of democratic renewal and resistance.
Part IV: Commentary on the Future of Liberal Democracy
The global rise of populism is not a transient storm but a systemic challenge rooted in deep-seated vulnerabilities within contemporary liberal democracies. An effective response requires more than a defense of the institutional status quo; it demands a clear-eyed diagnosis of the underlying maladies that have made populist appeals so potent. The future of liberal democracy hinges on its ability to not only fortify its constitutional guardrails but also to address the legitimate grievances that have led millions of citizens to lose faith in the system. A strategy focused solely on institutional defense without attending to the substantive failures of governance is destined to fail, as it risks reinforcing the very populist narrative it seeks to combat.
A. Diagnosing the Vulnerabilities: Why Liberal Institutions Falter
Populism is a symptom of a crisis of representation and trust. Its success is built upon the real and perceived failures of liberal democratic governance over recent decades. Several interconnected factors have created a fertile ground for its growth.
First, profound socio-economic dislocation has left large segments of the population in Western democracies feeling left behind. Decades of globalization, deindustrialization, and rising inequality have led to stagnating wages and diminished economic security for the working and middle classes, while a small elite has accrued unprecedented wealth. This economic anxiety creates a receptive audience for populist leaders who offer simple explanations, blaming “corrupt” domestic elites, immigrants, and unfair foreign competition for complex economic problems.
Second, this economic malaise is compounded by a severe erosion of public trust in core institutions. Decades of polling data show a steady decline in public confidence in government, the media, political parties, and even the courts. This widespread distrust creates a political vacuum, which charismatic populist outsiders, claiming to be uncorrupted by the “system,” are perfectly positioned to fill. They thrive on the perception that established institutions are unresponsive and self-serving.
Third, the rise of affective political polarization has transformed political competition into a form of tribal warfare. In highly polarized societies, political opponents are no longer viewed as legitimate adversaries but as existential threats to one’s values and way of life. This makes compromise impossible, elevates the stakes of every election to a dangerous level, and fosters a willingness among citizens to tolerate anti-democratic behavior from their own side as long as it leads to victory over the other.
Finally, there is a widespread failure of representation, a sense that mainstream political parties have converged on a technocratic consensus, particularly on economic and cultural issues, leaving many voters feeling ignored and voiceless. Issues of national identity, immigration, and cultural change, often dismissed by established elites, have become powerful mobilizing forces for populist movements that promise to restore control to the “people” and defend traditional values against a perceived liberal cosmopolitanism.
B. Pathways to Reinforcement: Fortifying Constitutional Resilience for the 21st Century
Securing the future of liberal democracy requires a dual strategy: it must simultaneously defend its core institutions from immediate threats while undertaking deep reforms to address the root causes of public discontent. This is the central challenge—to repair the ship while sailing through the storm.
On the institutional front, several fortifications are necessary. Judicial appointment processes must be reformed to enhance transparency and insulate them from the intense pressures of short-term partisan politics, thereby rebuilding the judiciary’s reputation for impartiality. The constitutional and financial independence of crucial “guardrail” institutions, such as electoral commissions, anti-corruption agencies, and public auditors, must be strengthened to make them less vulnerable to capture. Furthermore, states should consider electoral reforms that mitigate the “winner-take-all” dynamics that fuel polarization, such as proportional representation systems that encourage coalition-building and broader representation.
However, institutional tinkering alone is insufficient. The social contract that underpins liberal democracy must be rebuilt. This requires tackling the economic grievances that drive populist resentment head-on. Policies aimed at reducing extreme inequality, strengthening social safety nets, investing in education, and ensuring that the benefits of economic growth are more broadly shared are not just matters of economic justice; they are prerequisites for democratic stability. Alongside economic reform, a concerted effort is needed to rebuild a shared civic reality. This involves significant investment in civic education and digital media literacy to equip citizens with the tools to discern credible information from propaganda and conspiracy theories, thereby inoculating the body politic against the virus of misinformation.
Ultimately, the most potent defense of liberal democracy is a confident and compelling reaffirmation of its core values. For too long, its defenders have been on the back foot, ceding the moral high ground to populists who speak a language of community and belonging, however exclusionary. Liberal democracy must make a stronger, more affirmative case for itself, demonstrating that its principles of pluralism, tolerance, individual rights, and the rule of law are not weaknesses but profound strengths. It must prove, through both its actions and its aspirations, that it is the only system of government capable of delivering both freedom and security, accommodating diversity, and providing a framework for peaceful progress in a complex world. The challenge is not merely to survive the populist moment, but to emerge from it with a renewed sense of purpose and a more resilient, just, and responsive democratic order.
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