Executive Summary
Bangladesh, a nation founded on the principles of nationalism and unity, adopted a unitary state structure in direct response to the failed federal experiment it experienced as East Pakistan. This historical context provides a critical foundation for its constitutional design. The current system, as defined by its 1972 Constitution, concentrates supreme power in the central government and has been credited with preserving national cohesion. However, this same centralization has created significant governance challenges, including a lack of local autonomy, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and a substantial disconnect between the administration and the needs of its diverse population. The judiciary is overburdened, and the distribution of resources is often perceived as inequitable.
Calls for a federal system have emerged as a potential solution to these issues, with proponents arguing that it could enhance democratic participation, improve access to justice, and allow for more tailored, regional development. Yet, a transition to a full federation carries the profound historical risk of fragmentation and secession, a danger that led Bangladesh to its unitary model in the first place. The evidence suggests that a simple, binary choice between a federal and a unitary system is insufficient to address Bangladesh’s complex socio-political landscape.
The most pragmatic and stable path forward is not a shift to a de jure federation but the implementation of a robust, constitutionally-entrenched devolution model. This approach would draw on the legal principles of federalism—namely, the constitutional entrenchment of powers—while retaining the unitary state’s fundamental structure. By codifying genuine, irreversible autonomy for sub-national units in key policy areas, such as local governance, health, and education, Bangladesh could foster local leadership and improve service delivery without risking its territorial integrity. Such a reform requires a deliberate, consensus-driven process centered on empowering the judiciary and ensuring the financial and administrative independence of local bodies.
Introduction: The Enduring Question of State Structure
The question of how a nation should distribute governing power is one of the most fundamental in constitutional law and political science. It dictates the relationship between the central authority and its constituent regions, defines the mechanisms of accountability, and shapes a country’s ability to represent the will of its people. This global debate between unitary and federal systems is not a matter of abstract political theory; it is a practical and enduring question with profound consequences for a nation’s stability and prosperity.
For the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, a country established through a singular and unifying liberation struggle, this question holds a particular gravity. Its constitutional architects explicitly chose a unitary framework as a bulwark against the regionalism and political disenfranchisement that defined its experience as a part of Pakistan. Today, as Bangladesh navigates the complexities of modern governance—from political centralization to judicial backlogs and uneven development—the efficacy of that original decision is being re-examined. This report provides a comprehensive, expert-level analysis of federal and unitary governance models, drawing on comparative legal principles and case law from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to inform a nuanced assessment of which model, or what hybrid approach, is best suited for Bangladesh’s constitutional future.
Conceptual Foundations: Defining the Governance Paradigms
To understand the constitutional debate in Bangladesh, it is essential to first establish a clear and precise definition of the two primary governance paradigms: the unitary state and the federal state. These models are distinguished not merely by the presence or absence of sub-national governments, but by the legal and constitutional basis of power distribution.
The Unitary State: Central Supremacy and Delegated Power
A unitary state is defined as a sovereign entity in which a single central government holds ultimate governing authority.1 While such a state may possess administrative divisions—such as provinces, regions, or departments—these units exist at the discretion of the central government. The power they exercise is not inherent or constitutionally guaranteed; it is delegated by statute and can be unilaterally altered or withdrawn by the supreme central authority.1 This fundamental principle means that administrative divisions are subordinate agents of the center.6
A prominent example of a unitary state is the United Kingdom. Although power has been transferred to legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland through a process known as devolution, this is an act of Parliament, not a constitutional pact between sovereign entities.7 The
Scotland Act 1998 legislated for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, but the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that Westminster retains the legal authority to amend or even abolish the devolved institutions.8 This asymmetric nature of the UK’s devolution, where different constituent countries hold varying degrees of power, demonstrates the non-entrenched, statutory basis of power distribution within a unitary framework.8 It is also important to note that a unitary state is not synonymous with an authoritarian regime. While authoritarian states are by necessity unitary, a unitary state can be a robust democracy, where the government is accountable to the electorate.2 The core distinction is the legal source of power, not the political character of the government.
The Federal State: Dual Sovereignty and Entrenched Autonomy
In contrast, a federal state is characterized by a constitutional union of partially self-governing entities, such as provinces or states, under a federal government.11 The key legal feature of a federation is that the division of power between the central government and the sub-national units is constitutionally entrenched and cannot be altered by a unilateral decision from either party.1 This system is predicated on the concept of “dual sovereignty,” where the same territory is controlled by two distinct levels of government, each with the power to make laws and a degree of autonomy from the other.12
The United States serves as the canonical example of a federal state. Its Constitution establishes specific “enumerated powers” for the federal government, such as regulating interstate commerce and declaring war.12 Simultaneously, the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers that are not delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the states, which are known as “reserved powers” and include areas like education and public safety.12 Additionally, both levels of government share “concurrent powers,” such as the authority to tax, build roads, and establish courts.12
Within the federal model, two major variants have been observed historically. Dual Federalism, often referred to as “layer-cake federalism,” is a system where the national and state governments operate separately with clearly defined and largely non-overlapping spheres of power.14 In this model, the two layers of government are distinct and independent. This system was the predominant form of American governance until the 1930s.16 The subsequent shift to
Cooperative Federalism, or “marble-cake federalism,” saw the lines between the two governments’ powers blur as they began working together to solve shared, complex problems.15 This model, which gained prominence with President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, relies on intergovernmental partnerships and the provision of federal funding to incentivize state cooperation on national programs.16
A Comparative Legal Analysis of Power Distribution
A comparative analysis of the legal and constitutional principles of federalism and devolution reveals the nuanced ways in which power is distributed in practice. The experiences of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada offer vital lessons for any nation considering constitutional reform.
The American Federation: The Evolution of Dual Sovereignty
The U.S. Constitution, with its system of dual sovereignty, established a clear division of power. However, the exact boundaries of that division have been subject to continuous judicial interpretation. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution declares that federal laws and treaties are the “supreme law of the land”.12 This provision, coupled with the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers to the states, created a fertile ground for legal disputes over the scope of federal authority.
A defining moment in this evolution was the landmark Supreme Court case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).19 At its core, the case addressed the question of whether the federal government had the implied power to establish a national bank. Chief Justice John Marshall, in a seminal opinion, delivered a broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, affirming that the federal government possessed powers beyond those explicitly listed in the Constitution.19 The Court rejected Maryland’s argument that the power to create corporations was a reserved power of the states, noting that unlike the Articles of Confederation, the Tenth Amendment did not use the word “expressly” when qualifying delegated powers. This omission, the Court reasoned, left the door open for incidental or implied powers necessary to carry out the functions of the federal government.19 This judicial ruling did more than just settle a case; it fundamentally expanded the scope of federal authority and provided the legal foundation for the later evolution from a strictly dual federalism model to one of cooperation, where the national government could enact broad policy initiatives that involved and sometimes regulated state-level activity.13
The United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty and Statutory Devolution
In stark contrast to the U.S. model, the U.K. constitution is built on the uncodified, but powerful, principle of parliamentary sovereignty.8 All governing power ultimately resides in the Parliament in Westminster. The process of devolution in the late 20th century was not a transfer of sovereignty but a statutory delegation of power. Acts of Parliament, such as the
Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, created devolved institutions and defined their powers, distinguishing between matters that are “reserved” to Westminster and those that are “devolved” to the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and Northern Ireland Assembly.8
Reserved matters, which are those still under the exclusive control of the U.K. Parliament, include foreign affairs, defense, national security, and immigration, among others.20 Devolved matters, such as health, education, and local government, are the responsibility of the sub-national legislatures.20 While a political convention known as the Sewel Convention states that the U.K. Parliament will “not normally” legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the relevant body, this is not a legally binding constraint.8 The legal ability to unilaterally alter or abolish devolution remains with the central government, which is the defining characteristic of a unitary state.5
The Canadian Federation: Judicial Interpretation and the “Living Tree”
The Canadian federal system, established by the Constitution Act, 1867, distributes legislative powers between the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures.25 This constitutional division is considered “exhaustive,” meaning any new area of legislative activity must be interpreted as falling under a power already set out in the Act.26 This has made judicial interpretation a central and continuously evolving feature of Canadian federalism.26
The early history of Canadian federalism was marked by a sharp judicial debate over the framers’ intent, as seen in the case of Severn v. Ontario (1878).27 The Supreme Court was divided on whether the framers intended to create a strong central government, as admired in the U.K. model, or a system of co-equal legislative powers for the provinces.27 This early tension highlights the pivotal role of the judiciary in acting as a constitutional umpire, clarifying the division of powers over time.26 The Canadian constitution is often described as a “living tree” that must adapt to new situations and social realities, and this dynamic interpretation has been essential in guiding the country’s federal-provincial relations.26 This demonstrates that even with a constitutionally entrenched division of power, a strong and independent judiciary is a prerequisite for a stable federal system.
The Case of Bangladesh: A Unitary State at a Crossroads
The constitutional structure of Bangladesh cannot be understood without its historical origins. The nation was born from a liberation struggle that was, at its core, a rejection of a specific federal arrangement. This historical trauma and the subsequent governance choices have defined the nation’s political trajectory.
Historical and Constitutional Basis
Bangladesh’s Constitution, adopted on November 4, 1972, explicitly and unequivocally defines the nation as a “unitary, independent, sovereign Republic”.28 This is a powerful constitutional declaration of intent. The unitary nature was a direct response to the Pakistani federal model, which was perceived as a “quasi-federation” with an overbearing central government that failed to address the ethno-nationalist and linguistic demands of the Bengali population.30 The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, a federal state, is a historical testament to the risk of fragmentation when a federal model fails to accommodate regional aspirations.31 The drafters of the 1972 Constitution, seeking to prevent a similar fate, opted for a unitary state to ensure “the unity and solidarity of the Bangalee nation,” a principle enshrined in the Constitution itself.33
This historical context explains why the constitutional choice for a unitary system was not an arbitrary decision but a deliberate and defensive measure to preserve the national unity that was so hard-won in the liberation war. The founding principles of nationalism, democracy, and secularism were meant to provide a cohesive national identity that would transcend regional divisions.33
The Lived Reality of Governance
Despite its strong constitutional foundation, Bangladesh’s unitary system has faced significant governance challenges. The current framework, combined with a parliamentary model where the Prime Minister holds all executive power, has led to a major concentration of authority in the central government.35 This centralist model struggles to provide tailored solutions to highly localized issues like poverty and climate vulnerability, which vary significantly from region to region.37
Furthermore, the existing decentralization is “largely superficial” and functions more as a top-down administrative mechanism than a system of genuine local autonomy.35 Local government institutions, while numerous, are often sidelined by central interference, lack adequate financial resources, and rely heavily on the central government for funding.37 This has led to a disconnect where local bodies merely execute decisions made by central authorities, rather than serving as genuine instruments of democratic participation and accountability.35 The lack of local autonomy and the concentration of power have contributed to a significant case backlog in the national judiciary and a general perception of unresponsiveness and inefficiency in public service delivery.37
The Debate for Bangladesh: Arguments and Risks
The debate over whether Bangladesh should adopt a new governance model is driven by a deep-seated tension between the need for national unity and the desire for more accountable and effective governance.
Arguments for a Federal System
Proponents of a federal system for Bangladesh point to its potential to address the core governance failures of the current unitary model. A key argument is that federalism would enhance democratic participation by fostering local leadership and creating “a hub of peoples’ participation”.41 Stronger provincial or regional governments would be empowered to address local needs and promote healthy competition among political parties at different levels of administration.35
Another compelling argument relates to the improvement of access to justice. A federal structure could alleviate the overwhelming case backlog in the national courts by decentralizing the judicial system.35 Legal experts have proposed the creation of “village courts” to provide accessible, community-based dispute resolution, particularly for rural populations who face significant barriers to accessing the formal legal system.39 Finally, a federal model would allow for the development of context-specific solutions to issues such as poverty and climate-induced vulnerabilities, which are currently addressed through a one-size-fits-all approach from Dhaka.37
Arguments Against a Federal System
Despite the potential benefits, a shift to a federal system carries substantial and well-founded risks. The most powerful counterargument is rooted in Bangladesh’s own history. The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan demonstrates that a federal system, when not carefully constructed, can provide a legitimate power base for regional groups and lead to ethnic conflict and state dissolution.31 The very reason Bangladesh adopted a unitary system was to safeguard its national unity and prevent a repeat of this painful experience.33 The emergence of separatist movements following independence further underscores the continued relevance of this risk.30
From a governance perspective, a federal system can lead to administrative complexities and a form of “over-government” that hinders rather than helps development.42 Critics also point to the potential for harmful competition between states, where regions might engage in a “race to the bottom” by lowering corporate taxes to attract business at the expense of social welfare.43 This dynamic could exacerbate existing inequalities. Furthermore, there is a risk that powerful corporations could more easily exert control over smaller, sub-national governments, thereby fostering corruption.43 A strong, unified central government is sometimes seen as a necessary check on these powerful economic interests.43
Synthesis and A Proposed Path Forward
The constitutional dilemma facing Bangladesh is not a simple binary choice between two theoretical ideals. It is a complex negotiation between the desire for localized, accountable governance and the imperative of maintaining national unity and stability. A full federal system, despite its potential to democratize governance, carries a historical risk of fragmentation that is too significant to ignore. The current unitary system, however, with its superficial decentralization, is increasingly proving inadequate in addressing the diverse and complex needs of the population.
The most viable and pragmatic path forward is a hybrid model that synthesizes the best elements of both systems: a robust, constitutionally-entrenched devolution. This model would be distinct from the U.K.’s statutory devolution because the transfer of power would be secured by a constitutional amendment, making it far more difficult to unilaterally revoke. This would provide genuine, irreversible autonomy to local bodies while retaining the unitary state’s fundamental structure and its central role in defense, foreign policy, and national security.
To successfully implement such a model, several key constitutional and legal reforms are essential:
- Judicial Empowerment: The constitution must be revised to ensure the complete independence of the judiciary, giving the Supreme Court the authority to act as an impartial umpire in disputes between central and devolved authorities.35
- Codified Division of Powers: A clear, constitutionally-mandated division of powers should be created, specifying which areas are “reserved” for the central government and which are “devolved” to local authorities, thereby providing a clear legal framework for local action.20
- Fiscal Decentralization: Local governments must be granted the autonomy to raise and manage their own revenue, freeing them from the complex, bureaucratic, and often biased central funding processes that currently limit their ability to provide effective service delivery.37
- Strengthening Local Bodies: The governance structures of local institutions must be reformed to ensure genuine democratic balance, preventing the concentration of power and promoting inclusivity for all segments of society, including women.37
Conclusion: Charting a Course for Bangladesh’s Constitutional Future
The constitutional history of Bangladesh is a testament to its people’s fierce dedication to self-determination and national unity. The original unitary framework, born from a rejection of a failed federal model, has served its primary purpose of preserving state cohesion. However, as the nation has evolved, the limitations of this centralized structure have become increasingly apparent, fueling a legitimate debate about its constitutional future.
The path forward for Bangladesh is not a return to a failed federalist experiment but an evolution toward a more mature form of governance. By adopting a constitutionally-entrenched devolution model, Bangladesh can harness the benefits of local autonomy and democratic participation while safeguarding the national unity that was so hard-won. This requires a deliberate and consensus-driven process of constitutional reform that prioritizes the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the genuine empowerment of its people at every level of administration. This approach offers a pragmatic and stable blueprint for a more equitable, efficient, and responsive governance model for the future.
Appendix: Comparative Governance Table
| Feature | United States (Federal) | United Kingdom (Unitary with Devolution) | Proposed Model for Bangladesh (Unitary with Constitutional Devolution) |
| System Type | Federal State | Unitary State | Unitary State (with enhanced devolution) |
| Constitutional Basis | Codified Constitution 12 | Uncodified, based on Parliamentary Sovereignty 8 | Codified Constitution 28 |
| Division of Powers | Constitutionally entrenched via enumerated, reserved, and concurrent powers 12 | Statutorily delegated via reserved and devolved matters 7 | Constitutionally entrenched via reserved and devolved matters |
| Primary Governing Principle | Dual Sovereignty 12 | Parliamentary Sovereignty 8 | Constitutional Supremacy & National Unity |
| Role of Judiciary | Acts as an umpire for constitutional disputes 19 | Parliament is supreme; judicial review is limited 20 | Independent and empowered to enforce constitutional limits on power 35 |
| Unilateral Change to Sub-national Powers | Not possible without a constitutional amendment 1 | Possible through an act of Parliament 5 | Not possible without a constitutional amendment |
| Examples of Powers | Enumerated (federal): war, interstate commerce.12 Reserved (state): education, public safety 12 | Reserved (Westminster): defense, foreign affairs.21 Devolved (Scotland/Wales): health, education 20 | Reserved (central): defense, foreign affairs. Devolved (local): local governance, education, healthcare |
